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Background=Study Context: Interactions between postural control and
cognitive activity as evidenced by dual-tasking studies are common,
and especially pronounced in the elderly. Some authors have used this
finding to suggest that posture is ‘‘cognitively penetrable.’’
Methods: The authors present a critical look at the ‘‘cognitive penetra-
bility of posture’’ concept. The authors first trace the notion back to
Pylyshyn (1980, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 111–169) in the con-
text of visual information processing.
Results: The authors then argue that dual-tasking interference effects
do not prove that posture is penetrable by cognition.
Conclusion: The authors conclude that it may be valid to study cogni-
tive penetrability of posture, but that such an endeavor is served best by
adopting a hierarchical model of action control.
The increased risk of falling in the elderly has led numerous research-
ers to investigate how cognitive factors such as attention relate to
postural stability. Pertinent literature has consistently demonstrated
that (a) elderly need more attention to regulate their balance
compared with young adults, and (b) elderly find it more difficult to
combine a balance task with a cognitive task (e.g., Woollacott &
Shumway-Cook, 2002). Elucidating the relationship between cognition
Received 25 June 2010; accepted 9 November 2010.
Address correspondence to John F. Stins, Research Institute MOVE, Faculty of Human
Movement Sciences, VU University Amsterdam, van der Boechorststraat 9, 1081 BT,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Experimental Aging Research, 38: 208–219, 2012
Copyright # Taylor & Francis Group, LLC







































and balance has clear clinical implications, and may lead to the
incorporation of attention training in rehabilitation schemes to
enhance postural stability (for a recent example, see Li et al., 2010).
The contribution of attention to the regulation of balance is typically
studied using the dual-task paradigm, which combines postural and
cognitive tasks, ideally (but not consistently) with different levels of dif-
ficulty. The literature on posture-cognition interactions is vast, and
some excellent reviews and empirical studies, some geared especially
toward aging, have been published (e.g., Brauer, Woollacott, &
Shumway-Cook, 2002; Frazier & Mitra, 2008; Huang & Mercer,
2001; Huxhold, Li, Schmiedek, & Lindenberger, 2006). Interaction
effects of posture and cognition are usually interpreted as a reflection
of the attentional demands involved in the joint execution of the two
tasks (e.g., Redfern, Jennings, Mendelson, & Nebes, 2009). In this
context, ‘‘cognitive penetrability’’ is an often-used term, which has
been introduced to indicate the extent to which cognitive processes
(attention, memory, etc.) impact on the regulation of the postural
control system.
Our current aim is to clarify the relation between dual-task findings,
and to evaluate the merits of the notion of ‘‘cognitive penetrability.’’
To anticipate, we aim to demonstrate that the dual-tasking paradigm
can help to elucidate the supposed competition for attentional
resources between postural control and cognition, but that such find-
ings are not informative about the cognitive penetrability of posture,
as this is a different topic altogether. To this end, we present a brief
treatment of the history and scope of the cognitive penetrability con-
cept, and the way it has been used in the motor control literature.
The phrase ‘‘cognitive penetrability of postural responses’’ was
probably first coined by Stelmach and Worringham (1985), but the
notion gained significant popularity since the study of Teasdale, Bard,
LaRue, and Fleury (1993). The phrase has surfaced since then in sev-
eral papers investigating the influence of cognition on the regulation
of posture (e.g., Caudron, Boy, Forestier, & Guerraz, 2008; Frazier
& Mitra, 2008; Mitra, 2003, 2004; VanderVelde, Woollacott, &
Shumway-Cook, 2005), the majority of which make use of a dual-
tasking paradigm. Teasdale et al. (1993) studied how balance require-
ments interacted with cognitive performance in different age groups.
Subjects (healthy young and elderly) were asked to stand stably and
quietly on a forceplate. At unpredictable moments a tone was pre-
sented, upon which subjects had to press a handheld button as soon
as possible. Importantly, the erratic center-of-pressure (COP) displa-
cements during standing were monitored online and the stimulus
was presented randomly when the COP was either in a central or a






































more eccentric position. For the elderly subjects it was found that
when the auditory stimulus was presented if the COP happened to
be in an eccentric position (i.e., where body posture was somewhat
unstable), the reaction times (RTs) were elevated significantly com-
pared with a more central position. Such an effect was not evident
for the young subjects. This finding was taken to suggest that the
elderly subjects required more ‘‘central cognitive processes’’ for the
regulation of posture, and that there was likely an ‘‘interdependence
between the sensorimotor and the cognitive systems in the control
of posture’’ (p. 11). Numerous subsequent studies have reached simi-
lar conclusions and offered similar interpretations.
The study by Teasdale et al. (1993) can be considered a landmark
paper that sparked off a whole gamut of posture-cognition interaction
studies. We have no intention to criticize this influential study, but we
believe the phrase ‘‘cognitive penetrability of posture’’ as used in the
literature raises more questions than it answers. Firstly, with respect
to the original study: the term ‘‘cognitive penetrability’’ was only used
in the title of the Teasdale et al. (1993) article, whereas in the actual
text itself the term ‘‘interdependence’’ was used to refer to the interac-
tion between central cognitive processes and peripheral sensorimotor
processes. In the present paper, we argue that ‘‘interdependence’’ is in
fact a much more suitable term than ‘‘cognitive penetrability.’’
Second, Teasdale et al. (1993) found that an eccentric position of
the center of pressure (COP) required more attention than a stable
(center) position, as evidenced by hampered information processing.
In this regard, it would arguably have made more sense to talk of
‘‘postural penetrability of cognition’’ instead of ‘‘cognitive penetra-
bility of posture control,’’ that is, if one wishes to use the term in
the first place.
COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY: BACKGROUND
Pylyshyn (1980, 1999) was one of the first to coin the phrase ‘‘cogni-
tive penetrability’’ in the field of cognitive science, a notion germane
to Jerry Fodor’s modularity of mind hypothesis (1983). Pylyshyn
was interested in whether central cognitive processes (beliefs, expecta-
tions, etc.) could influence visual information processing. He argued
that vision, especially during early stages of information processing,
operates according to its own set of rules and cannot be influenced
by cognition. According to this view, the visual apparatus processes
a set of sensory ‘‘propositions’’ (retinal input), leading to a perceptual
‘‘conclusion’’ (i.e., a visual experience). Importantly, this process of






































sensory ‘‘reasoning’’ is assumed to be unaffected by other mental
faculties. An often-cited example concerns our experience of visual
illusions such as the moon illusion. Despite our firm knowledge that
the moon does not change in shape and size, we cannot help but judge
the moon to be larger when it is close to the horizon than when it is
high up in the skies. This is a strong argument in favor of the thesis
that vision is impenetrable to cognition. Note that this thesis does
not rule out the possibility that vision is penetrable by other modules.
For example, it has been shown that visual perception and auditory
perception can interact in unexpected ways, as illustrated for example
by the McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). Another
example of cognitive impenetrability is found in the realm of affect;
it has been argued that emotions and moods (e.g., depression) are
resistant to cognitive efforts to change the contents of our affective
experience (e.g., Gerrans & Kennett, 2006). Emotions and moods
seem to have their own logic, in that they all have a common script
or structure (e.g., Scharland, 2006) that cannot be rewritten or over-
written by cognition. The logic thus dictates that emotions also qualify
as cognitively impenetrable faculties. On the other hand, a study by
Dunn, Dalgleish, and Lawrence (2006) showed that the reward=
punishment schedule of the Iowa Gambling Task (a test designed to
measure emotional decision making) was cognitively penetrable.
This was taken to mean that decision making is influenced by the
anticipated consequences of behavior, both on a conscious and a non-
conscious level, consistent with Damasio’s (1994) influential somatic
marker hypothesis.
It is important to realize that cognitive impenetrability does not
imply complete independence. In the case of vision, there are numer-
ous instances in which beliefs, expectations, knowledge, etc., codeter-
mine the contents of our visual experience. For example, we may
deliberately choose to squint or focus our eyes, to close our eye, push
on our eyeball with a finger, etc. In a similar vein, we can make a con-
scious decision to focus our attention on certain parts of a visual scene
for the purpose of visual inspection or disambiguation. By way of
another example, if we are engaged in a difficult cognitive activity
(say, mental arithmetic), we may temporarily shut our senses from
external input. In all these instances visual experience is clearly affec-
ted by our will. As a final example, our knowledge base allows us to
perform sophisticated perceptual recognition and classification, such
that, for instance, an art expert ‘‘sees’’ other things in a painting than
a nonexpert. These examples imply that the contents of our visual
experience are partly determined by cognition. But as argued by
Pylyshyn, such examples of interaction between vision and cognition






































in no way invalidate the central thesis that vision is impenetrable by
cognition. What cognition does, instead, is setting the stage in a
top-down fashion in which the visual system can operate, albeit
according to its own logic.
COGNITIVE PENETRABILITY OF POSTURE
Although the notion of cognitive penetrability has been mainly
applied to visual awareness, a number of studies have applied this
notion to the organization of movement (e.g., Paillard, 1991),
especially the regulation of posture, but recently also to motor sequen-
cing (e.g., Fraser, Li, & Penhune, 2010). We believe two important
caveats are in place when we try to study the ‘‘cognitive penetrability
of posture control’’ (and, by extension, other motor activities). First, it
is questionable whether the dual-tasking paradigm is appropriate to
study cognitive penetrability in the first place. The cognitive penetra-
bility thesis as formulated by Pylyshyn (1980, 1999) refers to the puta-
tive influence of the contents of one module (e.g., cognition) on
another module (in the present case, posture). But the posture-
cognition dual-tasking paradigm is usually applied to answer a
related, yet different, question: The aim of dual-tasking is to highlight
the conditions under which cognition and posture make use of a
hypothesized common pool of attentional resources that can be
deployed to facilitate performance on either task. An often-voiced
conjecture is that humans possess a limited set of central attentional
resources that are strategically allocated to various cognitive and
motor tasks, such as the regulation of balance (e.g., Huang &Mercer,
2001; Woollacott & Shumway-Cook, 2002). The logic behind the
dual-task paradigm stipulates that as one task becomes more difficult
(and thus requires more resources), performance of other tasks dete-
riorates, but only if the tasks make use of the same resource pool.
Dual-tasking studies are concerned predominantly with the allocation
of processing resources among two or more tasks that are performed
simultaneously, such as working memory and selective attention (e.g.,
Stins, Vosse, Boomsma, & de Geus, 2004).
With respect to posture-cognition dual-tasking effects (and changes
therein, for example with aging), these effects are attributed in like
fashion to a strategic allocation of processing resources to the various
subtasks, using some sort of prioritization principle (e.g., Doumas,
Smolders, & Krampe, 2008) and=or a mechanism of divided attention
(Huang & Mercer, 2001). Note that, with a few exceptions (Li,
Lindenberger, Freund, & Baltes, 2001), the majority of studies have






































failed to control how subjects allocate attentional resources to the
various tasks (e.g., balance and cognition). Crucially, interference
between tasks does not mean that the contents of one task dictate
the contents of the other task; interference means that the combined
mental ‘‘fuel’’ required by both tasks has reached its limit, so that
one task (or both) can no longer be performed in an optimal fashion.
Thus, the dual-task paradigm is mainly concerned with quantifying
the attentional demands of concurrent task performance, and less so
with the question whether information processing on one task, such
as cognition, has a direct impact on parameters of the ‘‘motor pro-
gram’’ (see below).
Interpretation of posture-cognition dual-tasking results is compli-
cated further by the fact that postural changes during dual-tasking
do not necessarily reflect postural decrements. Empirically, the field
of posture-cognition dual-tasking is riddled by conflicting, often dia-
metrically opposed results. Redfern et al. (2009) pointed out that
experiments using a cognitive task (working memory) and a concur-
rent postural task in older adults have yielded conflicting results. In
a similar vein, Fraizer and Mitra (2008) and Prado, Stoffregen, and
Duarte (2007) reported that studies using healthy adults have found
postural deterioration with a cognitive secondary task, whereas other
studies found no effect at all, and still others even found postural
improvements. Part of the discrepancy may be due to the fact that it
is not always clear what qualifies as postural deterioration. Parti-
cularly in the field of postural disturbances due to aging or pathology,
it is common to equate high variability of body sway with low postural
stability (hence, poor postural performance). However, several
authors have questioned this assumption, and argued that body sway
can be strategically modulated to facilitate performance of the second-
ary (‘‘suprapostural’’) task (e.g., Stoffregen, Hove, Bardy, Riley, &
Bonnett, 2007; Stoffregen, Smart, Bardy, & Pagulayan, 1999)—at
least with respect to situations involving postural stabilization and
visual fixation. In a similar vein, Fraizer and Mitra (2008) argued that
postural control not only guarantees successful balance, but also pro-
vides a physical substrate for perceptual-cognitive tasks. We believe
there may be other reasons besides reduced postural stability that
may explain the often-observed increase in body sway in dual-tasking,
but, as far as we know, have never been tested. One possibility is that
the increase in body sway during cognitive activity reflects uninten-
tional attempts of the actor to increase arousal by self-generated
bodily motions, thereby facilitating information processing. Another
possibility is that the cognitive activity is mirrored in subtle body
movements that facilitate information processing, but are not






































typically recorded (e.g., silent vocalization, head nodding, or hand
motions during problem solving). For example, Carlson, Avraamides,
Cary, and Strasberg (2007) found that hand gestures performed dur-
ing mental arithmetic tasks can serve as a form of external working
memory, thereby supporting the representational and computational
activities needed to accomplish the tasks (see also Schwartz & Black,
1996). Thus, increased bodily motions might have a causal role in cog-
nitive activity, and the resulting increased body sway might then be
misinterpreted as balance loss. This issue clearly requires further test-
ing, but in our view underscores the thesis that the control of posture
and the control of cognitive activity mutually influence each other,
and are thus ‘‘interdependent.’’
A second problem pertaining to the cognitive penetrability of
posture control is that the mere observation that motor activity (as
in postural adjustments) interacts with cognitive activity does not
necessarily mean that the organization of the movement pattern is
subject to conscious awareness and control. This point was already
made by Pylyshyn (1980, 1999) in the context of visual awareness,
but it also applies to the issue of the cognitive penetrability of action.
One way of looking at maintaining upright stance is that it represents
an ongoing perceptuomotor activity, against the background of which
we can perform desired actions (cognitive, manual, or otherwise). It is
open to debate whether observed changes in this background activity
are attentional in nature, or that they reflect autonomic postural
adjustments to changes in task requirements. To give an example,
most of us would probably agree that the control of respiration is
an autonomous process that abides by homeostatic principles govern-
ing bodily processes. However, respiration is clearly affected by
psychological factors. For example, respirational parameters have
been found to be affected by the emotional state of the actor (e.g.,
Gomez, Zimmermann, Guttormsen-Schär, & Danuser, 2005; Homma
& Masaoka, 2008), by mental work load (e.g., Kotses, Westlund, &
Creer, 1987), and by imagined physical activity (e.g., Decety,
Jeannerod, Durozard, & Baverel, 1993). Should we now draw the con-
clusion that respiration is cognitively penetrable in a manner similar to
posture? We believe it is more fruitful to argue that respiration is a
physiological process that adapts in a highly flexible manner to chan-
ging energetic demands, for example, related to mental activity or
exerted effort. How about the converse situation? Suppose we ask sub-
jects to breathe in a predescribed fashion, for example, at a tempo dic-
tated by a metronome. This can only be accomplished by an effortful
attempt on the part of the actor to override the natural breathing
tendency and adopt another (more difficult) breathing pattern in






































place. First, the fact that we can voluntarily modulate our breathing
pattern does not imply that respiration is cognitively penetrable, for
the same reason as forwarded by Fodor (1983) and Pylyshyn (1980,
1999) with regard to vision. Second, it would probably come as no
surprise that in such a situation subjects would perform poorly on a
secondary cognitive task, because they need attention to monitor
and control their respiration. But again, this does not mean that the
control of respiration itself is attention demanding; it means that when
we voluntarily disturb the natural breathing cycle and adopt an
‘‘unnatural’’ pattern instead, we must deploy cognitive resources,
the costs of which can be quantified by a dual-tasking paradigm.
SO, IS POSTURE COGNITIVELY PENETRABLE?
Despite the caveats formulated in the preceding, we deem it perfectly
reasonable to ask whether posture is cognitively penetrable, especially
when we adopt a perspective of motor control as being organized in a
hierarchical fashion. Hierarchical models of motor control are quite
common (e.g., Rosenbaum, 2010), and figure especially prominently
in neurology. Simply put, the top level within the hierarchy is assumed
to be responsible for long-range planning processes, and is involved in
the selection of movement goals. Furthermore, the top level oversees
whether motor performance is successful, and it can initiate a switch
to another action plan, if necessary. The top level delegates the
implementation of action plans to lower levels, which encode increas-
ingly fine-grained elements of the action, such as sequencing and the
regulation of kinematic details. The lowest ‘‘online’’ level is devoted
to fast online monitoring and correcting of individual movements.
Execution of motor tasks involves the orchestrated activity of each
of these levels.
According to Glover (2005), this way of thinking can help to shed
light on the question whether movements are cognitively penetrable.
Glover (2005) distinguished five levels of motor control, ranging from
conscious to automatic control. Importantly, the highest level requires
conscious control, and is thus cognitively penetrable. The lowest level,
in contrast, involves fast automatic adjustments that take place out-
side conscious awareness. As a consequence, the lowest level is
immune to cognitive influences and is thus cognitively impenetrable.
Thus, the higher up in the hierarchy of motor plans we proceed, the
more its contents can be modified by cognition, that is, the greater
the cognitive penetrability. A similar point was made by Pacherie
(2008), who also pointed out that the motor system is characterized






































by limited cognitive penetrability. Glover (2005) presented evidence of
his model, using behavioral evidence (e.g., perturbation studies) and
neurological evidence. Although the evidence presented was mainly
focused on reach-to-grasp movements, we believe the proposed model
can also be applied to the regulation of posture. The top of the hier-
archy would then consist of conscious and effortful (attention-
demanding) postural adjustments, such as the voluntary decision to
initiate a step in a particular direction from quiet stance, attempts
to oscillate the body center of mass at a predefined tempo, or situa-
tions involving postural challenges, such as walking at a slippery sur-
face. Regulation of posture at the bottom of the hierarchy would likely
consist of fast and automatic postural microadjustments that we per-
form all the time without giving such corrections much thought. In
fact, even if we wanted to we could never directly access and control
that particular level of motor implementation, as it likely involves
spinal feedback loops that are outside our conscious reach.
Now, reduced postural capacities (and the associated increased fall
risk) due to aging or pathology can be the result of decrements at any
level of the action hierarchy. A reduced ability to control posture at
the top level may result, for example, in failing to select an optimal
walking route through a cluttered room, or an inability to flexibly
adjust posture to changing environmental demands. A reduced ability
to control posture at the lowest level might consist in small timing
errors (e.g., due to reduced propriocepsis), which in the context of
postural equilibrium may make the difference between maintaining
balance and experiencing a fall. Note that in the case of deteriorated
posture at the online level, the subject may very well be aware that
the automatic postural control system has been compromised in some
ways, rendering it less reliable. In that case, attention-demanding
‘‘support troops’’ can be brought in to provide extra support for bal-
ance, for example, by closely monitoring one’s own body, or adopting
balance safety strategies. In this respect, attentional resources could be
thought of in a similar fashion as cognitively driven activities that aid
a degraded visual system.
CONCLUSION
Pylyshyn (1980, 1999) argued that visual processing is cognitively
impenetrable. At the same time, cognition can greatly aid the visual
system by, for example, active exploration, disambiguation, increasing
resolution (such as looking through glasses), etc. In the same way, the
control of fast online postural adjustments is cognitively impenetrable,






































but we can exert some degree of attention-demanding control over it
when needed, for example, to compensate for age-related changes in
balance safety. Attentional control of posture is especially sensitive
to secondary task challenges, as in ‘‘talking while walking.’’ Posture-
cognition interactions effects are common, across all age groups, but
more so in the elderly. This is due in part, we believe, to an age-related
change in strategy towards a more conscious control mode of balance.
This compensatory mechanism, however, is at risk of cognitive inter-
ference, and reduces the ability to perform concurrent postural and
cognitive activities. The hierarchical model of cognitive penetrability
of actions of Glover (2005) can be used to generate predictions regard-
ing the neural level at which age-related changes in balance take place,
and to assess the likelihood of successful cognitive interventions of
balance loss.
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